Watergate: from the break-in to the resignation (1972–1974)

The Senate report states that Liddy presented the first Gemstone plan to Attorney General Mitchell at the Justice Department on January 27, 1972, with Magruder and Dean present.

“The first Gemstone plan was presented to Attorney General Mitchell by Liddy at a meeting in Mitchell’s Justice Department office on January 27, 1972. Magruder and Dean were also in attendance.”

The report states that one part of the plan called for electronic surveillance and break-ins at targets not yet identified, and that the budget for the whole plan was $1 million.

“Electronic surveillance and break-ins at various targets not yet identified at the time of the meeting. The budget for the plan was $1 million.”

The report states that Liddy’s plan was not approved at the January 27 meeting.

“Liddy’s plan was not approved at the meeting.”

Mitchell testified that he told Liddy at the January 27 meeting to “take the stuff out and burn it”, while Hunt testified that Liddy reported the plan was turned down as too expensive and that he was told to redraft it.

“Mitchell testified that, at the January 27 meeting, he told Liddy to “take the stuff out and burn it.” However, Hunt testified that Liddy reported that the plan had been turned down because it was too expensive and that he (Liddy) had been instructed to redraft it.”

Dean testified that he told Liddy such discussions should not go on in front of the Attorney General.

“Dean testified that, after arriving late for this meeting, he advised Liddy that such discussions should not go on in front of the Attorney General of the United States.”

The Senate report states that on February 4, 1972 the same group met in the Attorney General’s office and heard Liddy present a reduced plan calling only for surreptitious photography and electronic surveillance.

“On February 4, 1972, the same group again met in the Attorney General’s office and listened to Liddy present a watered-down version of his intelligence plan. This time the plan called only for surreptitious photography and electronic surveillance.”

Magruder testified that Liddy’s proposal was not approved at the February 4 meeting but postponed.

“Liddy’s proposal, Magruder testified, was not approved at the February 4 meeting, but postponed for consideration at a later time.”

According to Magruder’s testimony, Mitchell discussed possible targets including the Democratic National Committee headquarters in Washington.

“According to Magruder, Mitchell actually discussed possible targets for the new plan including the Democratic National Committee headquarters in Washington and at the convention, and the headquarters of the Democratic nominee.”

The Senate report states that Liddy’s plan was presented to Mitchell a third and final time on March 30, 1972 in Key Biscayne.

“The third and final time Liddy’s intelligence plan was presented to Mitchell was on March 30 in Key Biscayne, Fla.”

The Senate report states that by the time of the March 30, 1972 meeting the budget of Liddy’s plan had been reduced to $250,000.

“By this time, the plan’s budget had been reduced to $250,000.”

Magruder testified that Mitchell approved the project at Key Biscayne, although no one was enthusiastic.

“Magruder testified that the Liddy memorandum was the last item discussed in his meeting with Mitchell in Key Biscayne, and that, although no one was enthusiastic after discussing its pros and cons, Mitchell approved the project.”

Magruder testified that the approved $250,000 project called for an initial entry into the Democratic National Committee headquarters in Washington.

“Magruder testified that the approved $250,000 project called for an initial entry into the Democratic National Committee headquarters in Washington”

Mitchell denied approving the Liddy plan and said he told Magruder not to discuss it any further.

“Mitchell, however, denied approving the Liddy plan. He said he told Magruder “we don’t need this, I’m tired of hearing it, let’s not discuss it any further.””

LaRue, who was present, testified that he told Mitchell the plan was not worth the risk and that Mitchell said it was not something that would have to be decided at that meeting.

“he replied it was not worth the risk and Mitchell said, “Well this is not something we will have to decide on at this meeting.””

The Senate committee reported that the checks reached Barker’s account after Sloan turned them over to Liddy for cashing, and that Liddy used Barker for this purpose.

“Dean had been informed by Stans that the checks had reached Barker’s account after Sloan turned the checks over to Liddy for cashing. Liddy had used Barker for this purpose.”

The Senate committee reported that serial numbers on the $100 bills found on the burglars showed the money was what Barker gave Liddy when he cashed the Mexican and Dahlberg checks.

“The serial numbers on the $100 bills obtained from the burglars demonstrated that this was money Barker gave Liddy when he cashed the Mexican and Dahlberg checks.”

The Senate report states that Liddy quickly requested $83,000 from Sloan, who first checked the request with Magruder, who told him it was in order.

“Liddy quickly requested $83,000 from Sloan. Sloan testified that he first checked Liddy’s request with Magruder, who told him that it was in order and to comply.”

The report states that after meeting with Mitchell, Stans confirmed that Magruder had authority to make this kind of decision and that Sloan should pay the funds to Liddy.

“After meeting with Mitchell, Stans confirmed that Magruder had authority to make this kind of decision and that Sloan should pay the funds to Liddy.”

According to Sloan, Stans told him “I do not want to know and you don’t want to know”; Stans disputed the context but agreed it was the substance of what was said.

“Responding to Sloan’s concern about the purpose of such a payment, Stans, according to Sloan, said “I do not want to know and you don’t want to know.” Although Stans disputed the context in which Sloan placed the remark, he agreed that it was “the substance of what was said.””

Mitchell testified that he told Stans only that Magruder had authority to pay money to Liddy and that there was no mention of substantial funds.

“Mitchell, however, testified that he only told Stans that Magruder had authority to pay money to Liddy and that there was no mention of substantial funds.”

Asked when the funds (the Mexican cashier’s checks discussed in the preceding questions) reached the committee office, Sloan testified they arrived on the evening of April 5, 1972, brought by Roy Winchester.

“Senator ERVIN. When did those funds reach the committee office? Mr. SLOAN. On the evening of April 5. Senator ERVIN. How did they get there? Mr. SLOAN. Mr. Roy Winchester brought them to my office that evening.”

Sloan testified that Winchester’s briefcase, with checks and cash, totalled somewhere in the neighborhood of $700,000.

“Yes sir, he came in with a briefcase that, to the best of my recollection, in terms of checks, cash, including these cashier’s checks, totaled somewhere in the neighborhood of $700,000.”

Sloan testified that the Mexican checks and the Dahlberg check were considered pre-April 7 funds not covered by the new reporting legislation.

“They were considered to have been pre-April 7 funds and were considered not to be covered under the new legislation.”

The Senate Watergate Committee reported that a police unit led by Sergeant Paul Leeper discovered and arrested the five burglars.

“Within minutes, Sergeant Leeper and his unit discovered the five burglars and arrested them.”

The Nixon Library transcript records the meeting between the President and Haldeman in the Oval Office on June 23, 1972, from 10:04 to 11:39 a.m.

“TRANSCRIPT OF A RECORDING OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND H.R. HALDEMAN IN THE OVAL OFFICE ON JUNE 23, 1972, FROM 10:04 TO 11:39 AM”

Haldeman told Nixon that Mitchell had proposed, and Dean concurred, that the only way to solve the problem was through this approach.

“Mitchell came up with yesterday, and John Dean analyzed very carefully last night and concludes, concurs now with Mitchell’s recommendation that the only way to solve this”

In the June 23, 1972 conversation Haldeman told Nixon that Ken Dahlberg had given $25,000 in Minnesota and that the check went directly to Barker.

“He’s ah, he gave $25,000 in Minnesota and ah, the check went directly in to this, to this guy Barker.”

The Senate committee reported Haldeman’s testimony that on June 23, 1972, acting at Nixon’s direction, he and Ehrlichman called CIA Director Helms and Deputy Director Walters to the White House for a meeting.

“Haldeman testified that the next day, acting at President Nixon’s direction after meeting with him, Haldeman and Ehrlichman called CIA Director Helms and Deputy Director Walters to the White House for a meeting.”

The same report said Mrs. Mitchell told UPI’s Helen Thomas by telephone the day before that she had left John Mitchell, the former attorney general, until he quits politics.

“Mrs. Mitchell told Helen Thomas, White House reporter for United Press International, in a telephone call yesterday that she has left John Mitchell, the former attorney general, until he quits politics.”

The Washington Daily News reported on June 26, 1972 that Martha Mitchell said five guards employed by the Committee to Re-Elect the President threw her down on a bed and stuck a needle in her behind after a telephone was pulled from the wall of her bedroom in a villa at Newport Beach, Calif., the previous Thursday night.

“threw me down on the bed and stuck a needle in my behind”

A Library of Congress exhibit blog describes Martha Mitchell’s early telephone calls to journalist Helen Thomas as a key early signal in the Watergate story.

“first harried telephone calls to journalist Helen Thomas”

Stans testified he gave Kalmbach $75,000 on June 29, 1972 after being informed the money was needed for a special White House project.

“Stans testified he met with Kalmbach on June 29 and gave him $75,000, after being informed that the money was needed for a special White House project.”

The Senate report states that Bittman, after first refusing, accepted $25,000 in cash in a brown envelope left in a telephone booth in his office building.

“The third contact, William Bittman, Hunt’s attorney, after an initial rejection, agreed to accept $25,000 in cash in a brown envelope placed on a ledge in a telephone booth in his law office building.”

The Senate report states that Ulasewicz placed $40,000 for Unnamed private individualUnnamed████ in a locker at National Airport.

“Ulasewicz placed the $40,000 for Unnamed private individualUnnamed████ in a locker at National Airport in Washington”

The Senate report states that the total Unnamed private individualUnnamed████ was requesting was about $400,000 to $450,000.

“The total sum Unnamed private individualUnnamed████ was requesting was in the vicinity of $400,000-$450,000.”

The Senate report records that Kalmbach received additional money from LaRue on July 19, 1972, and that Kalmbach put the amount at $40,000 while LaRue estimated $20,000.

“According to Kalmbach the amount was $40,000; LaRue, however, estimated $20,000.”

The Senate report states that Kalmbach said he raised an additional $75,000 in cash from Thomas V. Jones, chairman of Northrop Corp.

“Kalmbach said he returned to California and raised an additional $75,000 in cash from a private contributor, Thomas V. Jones, chairman of Northrop Corp.”

Ehrlichman denied that he reassured Kalmbach about the payments, though he recalled a conversation in which secrecy was discussed.

“Ehrlichman denied that he reassured Kalmbach but did recall a conversation where secrecy was discussed”

The Senate report states that Hunt and Liddy were indicted with the five men apprehended in the DNC headquarters, in United States v. Liddy et al., by an indictment of Sept. 15, 1972.

“Subsequently Hunt and Liddy were indicted with the five men apprehended in the DNC headquarters (United States v. Liddy, et al., indictment of September 15, 1972)”

The Senate report states that on Sept. 19 Ulasewicz delivered the remaining funds: $53,000 to Unnamed private individualUnnamed████ and $29,000 to LaRue.

“On September 19, at LaRue’s urgent request, Ulasewicz flew to Washington from New York and delivered the remaining funds Kalmbach had given him — $53,000 to Unnamed private individualUnnamed████, $29,000 to LaRue.”

Slow Burn reported that the committee voted 20 to 15 against the subpoenas, with six Democrats voting no along with all 14 Republicans.

“The final vote was 20 to 15 against ordering the subpoenas.”

Slow Burn relayed a contemporaneous news report that six Democrats voted no along with all 14 of the committee’s Republicans.

“With six Democrats voting “no,” along with all 14 of the committee’s Republicans.”

The trial transcript records that on January 15, 1973 Barker, Martinez, Sturgis and Gonzalez each answered yes when the deputy clerk asked whether he wished to withdraw his plea of not guilty and enter a plea of guilty to Counts One through Seven of the indictment.

“Bernard L. Barker, Eugenio R. Martinez, Frank A. Sturgis, and Virgilio R. Gonzales, is it your desire to withdraw your plea of not guilty which you entered previously and now enter a plea of guilty to Counts One through Seven of the indictment? MR. BARKER: Yes. MR. MARTINEZ: Yes, sir. MR. STURGIS: Yes. MR. GONZALEZ: Yes.”

The Senate report states that as the trial opened in early January 1973, Hunt, Barker, Sturgis, Martinez and Gonzales changed their pleas to guilty.

“But, as the trial opened in early January 1973, Hunt, Barker, Sturgis, Martinez, and Gonzales changed their pleas to guilty.”

The report states that the remaining defendants, McCord and Liddy, were found guilty.

“The remaining defendants — McCord and Liddy — were found guilty”

The report’s introduction states the trial was prosecuted on the theory that Liddy, counsel for the Finance Committee to Re-Elect the President, had masterminded the break-in and that no higher campaign or White House officials were involved.

“The trial was prosecuted on the theory that G. Gordon Liddy, former FBI agent and counsel for the Finance Committee To Re-Elect the President, had masterminded the break-in of the Democratic National Committee headquarters and that no higher campaign or White House officials were involved.”

The WSPF report’s chronology dates the start of the break-in trial to Jan. 8, 1973, Hunt’s guilty plea to Jan. 11, and the pleas of Barker, Sturgis, Martinez and Gonzalez to Jan. 15.

“January 8, 1973 Watergate break-in trial begins. January 11, 1973 Hunt pleads guilty to charges in break-in indictment. January 15, 1973 Barker, Sturgis, Martinez and Gonzalez plead guilty to charges in break-in indictment.”

The WSPF report’s chronology records that Liddy and McCord were convicted on all counts on Jan. 30, 1973.

“January 30, 1973 Liddy and McCord are convicted on all counts of break-in indictment.”

The Senate report states that Hunt testified he received $75,000 in cash on March 20 or 21, just before his sentencing.

“Hunt testified that on March 20 or 21, just prior to his sentence, he received $75,000 in cash.”

The report states that LaRue admitted making the payment after approval from Mitchell.

“LaRue admitted making the payment to Hunt after approval from Mitchell.”

The report notes the U.S. v. Mitchell indictment alleged the final payment to Hunt was made on March 21, 1973, shortly after Dean, Haldeman and the President discussed Hunt’s demands.

“alleges that the final payment to Hunt by LaRue was made on March 21, 1973, (not March 20) shortly after Dean, Haldeman and the President discussed Hunt’s”

The transcript records a meeting among the President, Dean and Haldeman in the Oval Office on March 21, 1973, from 10:12 to 11:55 a.m.

“TRANSCRIPT OF A RECORDING OF A MEETING AMONG THE PRESIDENT, JOHN DEAN, AND H.R. HALDEMAN IN THE OVAL OFFICE, ON MARCH 21, 1973, FROM 10:12 TO 11:55 AM”

Dean told Nixon, “We have a cancer--within, close to the Presidency, that’s growing.”

“We have a cancer--within, close to the Presidency, that’s growing.”

After Dean estimated the defendants would cost a million dollars over two years, Nixon said a million dollars could be obtained in cash.

“What I mean is, you could, you could get a million dollars. And you could get it in cash. I, I know where it could be gotten.”

The Senate report states that on March 23, 1973 Chief Judge Sirica read aloud McCord’s sealed letter charging pressure on the defendants to plead guilty and remain silent, perjury at the trial, and participation by others.

“On March 23, 1973, Chief Judge Sirica read aloud the sealed letter received from McCord. As noted, the letter charged that pressure had been exerted on the defendants to plead guilty and remain silent, that perjury had been committed during the Watergate trial and that others than those adjudged guilty had participated in the Watergate operation.”

The WSPF report’s chronology records that on March 23, 1973 Judge Sirica issued provisional sentences for the break-in defendants except McCord and made McCord’s letter public.

“March 23, 1973 Judge Sirica issues provisional sentences for Watergate break-in defendants, except McCord; makes McCord’s letter public.”

Sloan agreed with committee counsel that the chart of cash he gave Liddy showed a total of $199,000, to the best of his recollection.

“Mr. DASH. I think the chart shows a total amount of $199,000. Is that correct, to the best of your recollection? Mr. SLOAN. To the best of my recollection, yes, sir.”

Sloan testified that Liddy came to him with a $250,000 budget and said the first item would be $83,000, which Magruder confirmed he should pay on request.

“He came to me with a budget of $250,000. He did not release that from his hand; he merely showed me the figure. He said, I will be coming to you for substantial cash payment, the first item of which will be $83,000 and I would like to pick that up in a day or two.”

Sloan testified that Magruder told him to go ahead and pay the $83,000 on request but that later distributions had to be cleared with him by telephone first.

“He indicated to me that what Mr. Liddy told me was correct, that I was to go ahead and pay the $83,000 on request, but that subsequent distributions were to be personally cleared with him by telephone prior to their being made and he wanted at that time to review both the timing and the amount.”

Sloan testified that Stans returned from a meeting with Mitchell, confirmed Magruder’s authority and said “I do not want to know and you don’t want to know.”

“He returned from that meeting with Mr. Mitchell and he confirmed that Mr. Magruder continued to have this authority, that I should pay these funds, and with regard to my question of concern about purpose, he said, “I do not want to know and you don’t want to know.””

Stans testified that he recalled the remark Sloan described and that it was “the substance of what was said”, though not the whole conversation.

“Now, with respect to the remark that was made after I checked with Mitchell about the authority of Magruder to ask Sloan to make payments to Liddy, I recall the occasion but that was not the whole conversation, and I am not quite sure that it is entirely accurate but it is the substance of what was said.”

Stans testified that the remark he made was something to the effect of “I don’t know what’s going on in this campaign and I don’t think you ought to try to know”, spoken in frustration over the campaign’s spending.

“The remark I made, and I cannot quote it precisely, was something to the effect that “I don’t know what’s going on in this campaign and I don’t think you ought to try to know.””

Stans testified that he had no record of a meeting with Mitchell on June 24 and recalled lunch with him on the 23rd.

“I have checked my records last night and I do not have any record of a meeting with Mr. Mitchell on the 24th of June. ... I did have lunch with Mr. Mitchell in his office on the 23d.”

Magruder testified that the last item discussed at Key Biscayne was Liddy’s proposal for about $250,000 and that Mitchell agreed to approve it.

“The last topic we discussed was the final proposal of Mr. Liddy’s which was for approximately $250,000. We discussed it, brought up again the pros and cons. I think I can honestly say that no one was particularly overwhelmed with the project. But I think we felt that the information could be useful, and Mr. Mitchell agreed to approve the project, and I then notified the parties of Mr. Mitchell’s approval.”

Magruder testified that the project was approved for an initial entry into the Democratic National Committee headquarters in Washington.

“It was specifically approved for initial entry into the Democratic National Committee headquarters in Washington, and that at a further date if the funds were available we would consider entry into the Presidential contenders’ headquarters and also potential at the Fontainebleau Hotel in Miami.”

Magruder testified that after returning to Washington he told Sloan that Liddy would be authorized to draw $250,000 over the campaign.

“I indicated to Mr. Sloan that Mr. Liddy would be authorized to draw $250,000 over the entire period of the campaign but that he probably would need a sizable amount of that initially.”

Dean testified that he did not know who kept pushing for the plans: Liddy, Magruder, or someone pushing Magruder.

“I do not know to this day who kept pushing for these plans. Whether Liddy was pushing or whether Magruder was pushing or whether someone was pushing Magruder, I do not know.”

Dean testified that after Liddy’s January 27, 1972 presentation Mitchell told Liddy the plan was not quite what he had in mind and the cost was out of the question, and suggested he revise it.

“When the presentation was completed, he took a few long puffs on his pipe and told Liddy that the plan he had developed was not quite what he had in mind and the cost was out of the question. He suggested to Liddy he go back and revise his plan, keeping in mind that he was most interested in the demonstration problem.”

Dean testified that at the February 4, 1972 meeting he said such discussions could not go on in the Office of the Attorney General, and that the meeting then ended.

“The only polite way I thought I could end the discussions was to inject that these discussions could not go on in the Office of the Attorney General of the United States and that the meeting should terminate immediately. At this point the meeting ended.”

Dean testified that he told Haldeman Liddy’s plan was incredible, unnecessary and unwise and that no one at the White House should have anything to do with it, and that Haldeman agreed.

“I told Haldeman what had been presented by Liddy and told him that I felt it was incredible, unnecessary, and unwise. I told him that no one at the White House should have anything to do with this. ... Haldeman agreed and told me I should have no further dealings on the matter.”

Dean testified that he began the March 21, 1973 meeting by telling the President there was a cancer growing on the Presidency that had to be removed immediately.

“I began by telling the President that there was a cancer growing on the Presidency and that if the cancer was not removed that the President himself would be killed by it. I also told him that it was important that this cancer be removed immediately because it was growing more deadly every day.”

Dean testified that he told the President he did not know how the plans had finally been approved and did not know if Mitchell had approved them.

“I proceeded to tell him how the matter had commenced in late January and early February but that I did not know how the plans had finally been approved. ... I told him I did not know if Mitchell had approved the plans but I had been told that Mitchell had been a recipient of the wiretap information and that Haldeman had also received some information through Strachan.”

Dean testified that he told the President Kalmbach had been used to raise funds to pay seven individuals for their silence at the instructions of Ehrlichman, Haldeman and Mitchell.

“I told him that Kalmbach had been used to raise funds to pay these seven individuals for their silence at the instructions of Ehrlichman, Haldeman, and Mitchell and I had been the conveyor of this instruction to Kalmbach.”

Mitchell testified that his decision on Liddy’s plan at Key Biscayne was a rejection, in words to the effect of “We don’t need this, I am tired of hearing it, out, let’s not discuss it any further.”

“Well, it was very simple. This, again, “We don’t need this, I am tired of hearing it, out, let’s not discuss it any further.” This sort of a concept.”

Asked to explain Magruder’s sworn testimony that he approved the plan, Mitchell answered that he could not explain anybody’s testimony but his own.

“Then how do you explain, Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Magruder’s sworn testimony that you, however reluctantly, approved the quarter million dollar Liddy plan at Key Biscayne? Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. Dash, I can’t explain anybody’s testimony up here except my own.”

John Mitchell told the Senate Watergate Committee on July 10, 1973 that the President spent a period of time on the telephone with Martha Mitchell trying to lift her spirits; Senator Gurney described it as a 23-minute talk.

“the President spent quite a period of time, as I recall, talking with my wife on the telephone trying to pep her up and tell her the world had not ended”

The Senate committee’s report states that Butterfield’s testimony revealed the tapes to the public on July 16, 1973, and that a subpoena issued July 23, 1973 sought five specified recordings.

“The existence of these tapes had been revealed to the public on July 16, 1973, through the testimony to the Committee of Alexander P. Butterfield, a former deputy assistant to the President.”

LaRue testified that Mitchell read the plan and asked what he thought, and that LaRue said he did not think it was worth the risk.

“Mr. Mitchell read it, he asked me if I had read it and I told him I had. He asked me what I thought of it and I told him I did not think it was worth the risk.”

LaRue testified that, to the best of his recollection, Mitchell said the plan was not something that would have to be decided at that meeting, and, asked whether Mitchell rejected it out of hand, answered “Not to my recollection.”

“Mr. Mitchell, to the best of my recollection, said something to the effect that, “Well, this is not something that will have to be decided at this meeting.” Mr. DASH. All right. To your recollection then, Mr. Mitchell did not reject that plan out of hand at that time, did he? Mr. LARUE. Not to my recollection; no sir.”

LaRue testified that he had no specific recollection of the plan’s budget being $250,000 and recalled it as “several hundred thousand”.

“No specific amount—to the best of my recollection, it was several hundred thousand. Mr. DASH. Would a quarter million, $250,000 be the figure? Mr. LARUE. I have no specific recollection of that.”

Strachan testified that Magruder called him after the March 30, 1972 Key Biscayne meeting and said a sophisticated political intelligence-gathering system had been approved with a budget of 300.

“During this call, he told me, and I am repeating his words rather precisely: “A sophisticated political intelligence-gathering system has been approved with a budget of 300.” Unfortunately he neither gave me, nor did I ask for any further details about the subject.”

Strachan testified that he then wrote an early-April “political matters” memo for Haldeman containing one three-line paragraph on political intelligence.

“This particular memo for early April was 8 to 10 pages long with more than a dozen tabs or attachments, but it contained only one three-line paragraph on political intelligence.”

Strachan quoted the memo as saying Magruder reports that 1701 now has a sophisticated political intelligence-gathering system with a budget of 300.

“Magruder reports that 1701 now has a sophisticated political intelligence-gathering system with a budget of 300. A sample of the type of information they are developing is attached at tab “H.””

Strachan testified that after he showed Haldeman the political matters memorandum on June 20, 1972, Haldeman told him “Well, make sure our files are clean.”

“He told me, “Well, make sure our files are clean.””

Strachan testified that he then shredded the memorandum and related documents, believing he was following Haldeman’s orders, and that this included all of political matters memorandum #18.

“Well, I went down and shredded that document and others related. Mr. DASH. Now, did you do that on your own initiative as such, or did you feel that you were making sure that you were following Mr. Haldeman’s instruction that you should make sure the files are clean? Mr. STRACHAN. No, I believed I was following his orders. Mr. DASH. And you shredded all of No. 18, the political matters memorandum No. 18? Mr. STRACHAN. That is correct.”

Ehrlichman testified that he would be terribly slow to reassure Kalmbach of the propriety of the undertaking without checking first, and that Kalmbach did not ask him.

“No. As a matter of fact, Mr. Chairman, as I have just told Mr. Thompson, I would be terribly slow to reassure Herb Kalmbach, whom I consider a good and close friend, of the propriety of any such undertaking, of any such undertaking without checking it first, if he had asked me, and I am testifying to you, Mr. Chairman, that he did not ask me.”

Ehrlichman testified that he had a conversation with Kalmbach in which they discussed secrecy, because Kalmbach said Ulasewicz was carrying money back and forth.

“I had a conversation with Mr. Kalmbach, Mr. Chairman, and I have no doubt that we, if he says so, that we discussed the question of secrecy because I do recall his saying that Mr. Ulasewicz was carrying money back and forth.”

Ehrlichman testified that he had nothing to do with the delivery details and that the passing of committee money through several hands to Kalmbach predated any conversation he had with Kalmbach.

“Well, Mr. Chairman, as you know, I had nothing to do with those details at all. As a matter of fact, I was quite surprised to learn in the testimony here that there was what amounted to a laundering process where committee money or money held by people in the committee were passed through several hands and around to Mr. Kalmbach for eventual delivery, and this, of course, all predated any conversation that Mr. Kalmbach and I had.”

Haldeman testified that a three-line item in a thick political matters memorandum covering about 30 decisions made at Key Biscayne would not have struck his attention.

“As Mr. Strachan has described it, a three-line item in a rather thick political matters memorandum dealing with, among other things, apparently 30 decisions that had been made by Mr. Mitchell at the Key Biscayne meeting, would not strike my attention; no.”

Asked whether Strachan had informed him by memo of a sophisticated intelligence system, Haldeman said he did not recall Dean so informing him and did not recall the other 29 or 30 decision items in that memorandum.

“I don’t recall Dean so informed but I don’t recall any of the other 30 or 29 decision items that were apparently also covered in that memorandum and it is not surprising that I wouldn’t.”

Haldeman testified that he did not recall asking for, or having Strachan prepare, a talking paper covering the intelligence plan.

“Mr. DASH. Well, do you recall asking or having Mr. Strachan prepare a talking paper that covered a number of these items and including the intelligence plan? Mr. HALDEMAN. No; and that wouldn’t be the normal process Mr. Dash.”

Haldeman testified that he did not recall the conversation Strachan described and did not recall giving Strachan an instruction to see that the file would be clean.

“I don’t recall the conversation. I don’t recall the testimony as being quite as you have described it. And as I said in my statement, I don’t recall Mr. Strachan or my giving Mr. Strachan such an instruction. Mr. DASH. Such an instruction to see that the file would be clean? Mr. HALDEMAN. That is correct.”

Asked why Strachan would shred the memo, Haldeman said that, by Strachan’s own statement, he destroyed what he considered politically embarrassing material and did not think it contained evidence of illegal activities.

“Well, by Mr. Strachan’s statement, which is the only really source I can use for knowing why, he indicates that he destroyed what he considered to be politically embarrassing material and as I recall under direct questioning he quite specifically said that he did not think he was destroying anything that contained any evidence of illegal activities.”

The WSPF report states that on the evening of Oct. 20 the White House announced that Nixon had ordered Richardson to dismiss Cox, that Richardson resigned rather than do so, that Ruckelshaus was fired for refusing, and that Solicitor General Robert Bork dismissed Cox.

“That evening, October 20, the White House announced the events that came to be known as the “Saturday Night Massacre”: President Nixon ordered Attorney General Richardson to dismiss Cox for his refusal to accept the White House proposal; Richardson resigned rather than carry out the order, and Deputy Attorney General William Ruckelshaus was fired for his refusal to obey; finally, Solicitor General Robert Bork, next in seniority at the Justice Department, dismissed Cox as Special Prosecutor.”

The report states that FBI agents, on White House orders, occupied the offices of the special prosecutor, the Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General to prevent removal of documents.

“Also on White House orders, agents of the FBI occupied the offices of WSPF, the Attorney General, and the Deputy Attorney General in order to prevent the removal of any documents.”

Three days after dismissing Cox, Acting Attorney General Bork rescinded the Special Prosecutor regulation retroactively to October 21, 1973, according to the district court’s findings.

“Thereafter, on October 23, Mr. Bork rescinded the underlying Watergate Special Prosecutor regulation, retroactively, effective as of October 21.”

On November 14, 1973, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia declared that Archibald Cox had been illegally discharged as Watergate Special Prosecutor.

“The Court declares that Archibald Cox, appointed Watergate Special Prosecutor pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 0.37 (1973), was illegally discharged from that office.”

The court found that the dismissal of Cox without a finding of extraordinary impropriety violated a Justice Department regulation having the force of law.

“The firing of Archibald Cox in the absence of a finding of extraordinary impropriety was in clear violation of an existing Justice Department regulation having the force of law and was therefore illegal.”

The court denied all injunctive relief, which would have reinstated Cox, and dismissed Ralph Nader as a plaintiff for lack of standing.

“All injunctive relief requested in the proposed preliminary injunction tendered at the hearing and in the Amended Complaint was denied from the bench.”

The WSPF report states that on Nov. 21, 1973 Buzhardt announced that the subpoenaed tape of the June 20, 1972 Nixon-Haldeman conversation had been obliterated by an 18½-minute buzzing sound.

“Buzhardt announced that the subpoenaed tape of a conversation between President Nixon and H. R. Haldeman on June 20, 1972—3 days after the Watergate break-in—had been obliterated inexplicably by a buzzing sound lasting 18½ minutes.”

The Judiciary Committee’s report records that on Feb. 6, 1974 the House adopted H. Res. 803 by a vote of 410 to 4.

“On February 6, 1974, the House of Representatives, by a vote of 410 to 4, adopted H. Res. 803.”

The WSPF report’s chronology records that on March 1, 1974 Colson, Ehrlichman, Haldeman, Mardian, Mitchell, Parkinson and Strachan were charged with offenses stemming from events following the June 17, 1972 break-in.

“Watergate cover-up indictment: Colson, Ehrlichman, Haldeman, Mardian, Mitchell, Parkinson, and Strachan are charged with offenses stemming from events following the break-in at the Democratic National Headquarters on June 17, 1972.”

The WSPF report’s chronology records that Special Prosecutor Jaworski issued a subpoena for specified documents for use in the grand jury on March 15, 1974.

“Special Prosecutor Jaworski issues subpoena for specified documents for use in grand jury.”

The chronology records that the President complied with the March 15 subpoena on March 29, 1974.

“President complies with the Special Prosecutor’s March 15 subpoena.”

The Supreme Court’s opinion in United States v. Nixon states that a subpoena duces tecum was issued to the President by the district court on April 18, 1974, upon the Special Prosecutor’s motion, returnable May 2; the WSPF chronology dates the Special Prosecutor’s subpoena April 16.

“On April 18, 1974, upon motion of the Special Prosecutor, see n. 8, infra, a subpoena duces tecum was issued pursuant to Rule 17 (c) to the President by the United States District Court and made returnable on May 2, 1974.”

The WSPF report’s chronology records that the Special Prosecutor issued a trial subpoena for 64 White House taped conversations on April 16, 1974.

“Special Prosecutor issues a trial subpoena for 64 White House taped conversations.”

The Supreme Court’s opinion in United States v. Nixon states that on May 20, 1974 the district court denied the President’s motion to quash the subpoena and his motions to expunge and for protective orders.

“On May 20, 1974, the District Court denied the motion to quash and the motions to expunge and for protective orders.”

The WSPF report’s chronology records that Judge Sirica enforced the Special Prosecutor’s trial subpoena of April 16 on May 20, 1974.

“Judge Sirica enforces Special Prosecutor’s trial subpoena of April 16.”

The chronology records that on May 31, 1974 the Supreme Court granted writs of certiorari on enforcement of the tapes subpoena.

“Supreme Court grants writs of certiorari on enforcement of tapes subpoena.”

The chronology records that the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in U.S. v. Nixon on July 8, 1974.

“Supreme Court hears oral arguments in U.S. v. Nixon.”

The Court held that the President’s generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial.

“the President’s generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial and the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice”

The opinion records that the case was decided on July 24, 1974 and that Justice Rehnquist took no part in it.

“Mr. Justice REHNQUIST took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.”

The opinion states that the March 1, 1974 grand jury named the President as an unindicted coconspirator.

“Although he was not designated as such in the indictment, the grand jury named the President, among others, as an unindicted coconspirator.”

The Judiciary Committee’s report records that on July 27, 1974 the committee adopted Article I by a vote of 27 to 11.

“On July 27, the committee agreed to the amendment in the nature of a substitute for Article I by a vote of 27 to 11. The committee then adopted Article I, as amended, by a vote of 27 to 11.”

The report records that on July 29, 1974 the committee adopted Article II by a vote of 28 to 10.

“On July 29, an amendment in the nature of a substitute was offered for Article II of the proposed resolution. After debate, the substitute was agreed to by a vote of 28 to 10. The committee then adopted Article II, as amended, by a vote of 28 to 10.”

The report records that on July 30, 1974 an additional article was adopted 21 to 17 and became Article III.

“was adopted by a vote of 21 to 17 and became Article III”

The House Parliamentarian’s House Practice records that the Judiciary Committee recommended three articles of impeachment against Nixon in July 1974, charging abuse of powers, obstruction of justice and contempt of Congress.

“The Committee on the Judiciary recommended to the House three articles of impeachment against President Nixon in July 1974. The articles charged him with abuse of his presidential powers, obstruction of justice, and contempt of Congress.”

House Practice records that Nixon resigned before the full House voted on the articles.

“Before the full House voted on these articles, President Nixon resigned.”

Nixon acknowledged that the June 23 tapes show he discussed the political aspects and was aware the course of action would limit exposure of people connected with the re-election committee.

“The June 23 tapes clearly show, however, that at the time I gave those instructions I also discussed the political aspects of the situation and that I was aware of the advantages this course of action would have with respect to limiting possible public exposure of involvement by persons connected with the reelection committee.”

Nixon stated on Aug. 5, 1974 that he was making public the transcripts of three conversations with Haldeman on June 23, 1972.

“I HAVE TODAY instructed my attorneys to make available to the House Judiciary Committee, and I am making public, the transcripts of three conversations with H. R. Haldeman on June 23, 1972.”

In the same statement Nixon maintained that the full record did not justify impeachment and removal.

“I am firmly convinced that the record, in its entirety, does not justify the extreme step of impeachment and removal of a President.”

In his Aug. 5, 1974 statement Nixon said the June 23 tapes show he “was aware of the advantages this course of action would have with respect to limiting possible public exposure of involvement by persons connected with the reelection committee.”

“I was aware of the advantages this course of action would have with respect to limiting possible public exposure of involvement by persons connected with the reelection committee.”

Nixon said he would resign the presidency effective at noon the next day and that Vice President Ford would be sworn in at that hour.

“Therefore, I shall resign the Presidency effective at noon tomorrow. Vice President Ford will be sworn in as President at that hour in this office.”

Nixon gave loss of political support in Congress as his reason.

“In the past few days, however, it has become evident to me that I no longer have a strong enough political base in the Congress to justify continuing that effort.”

Proclamation 4311 states that Nixon’s term continued until his resignation on Aug. 9, 1974.

“His term in office continued until his resignation on August 9, 1974.”

The proclamation is dated the eighth day of September 1974.

“In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my hand this eighth day of September, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and seventy-four”

The WSPF report states that the three-month trial of the five remaining defendants resulted in the convictions of Ehrlichman, Haldeman, Mardian and Mitchell and the acquittal of Parkinson.

“The trial of the five remaining defendants, which lasted 3 months, resulted in the convictions of Ehrlichman, Haldeman, Mardian, and Mitchell, and the acquittal of Parkinson.”

The report states that Mitchell, Haldeman and Ehrlichman were each sentenced to 2½ to 8 years and Mardian to 10 months to 3 years.

“Mitchell, Haldeman and Ehrlichman were each sentenced to serve 2½ to 8 years imprisonment, while Mardian received a 10-month to 3-year prison sentence.”

The report states the trial started on October 1.

“By the time the trial started on October 1, charges against Colson had been dismissed as a result of his guilty plea in another case”

The WSPF report’s case list records that Parkinson was acquitted on Jan. 1, 1975, the date of the verdicts in the trial.

“Pleaded not guilty March 9, 1974. Acquitted January 1, 1975.”

The D.C. Circuit affirmed Liddy’s conviction.

“the order prohibiting disclosure of the contents of the intercepted conversations vindicated the rights of the movants without undue interference with the rights of the accused. Affirmed.”

The D.C. Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Liddy describes Liddy’s appeal from his conviction on charges relating to the burglary and wiretapping of the DNC offices.

“Appellant Liddy seeks reversal of his conviction on charges relating to the burglary and wiretapping of the offices of the Democratic National Committee in the Watergate apartment-office building complex in the early morning hours of Saturday, June 17, 1972.”

The D.C. Circuit held that McCord’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was without merit and that his conviction on eight counts of burglary, conspiracy and wiretapping must be affirmed.

“It follows that the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is without merit and McCord’s conviction on eight counts of burglary, conspiracy and wiretapping must be Affirmed.”

The WSPF report records that the Supreme Court denied certiorari to Liddy on January 27, 1975, to McCord on April 21, 1975 and to Barker on June 9, 1975.

“Petitions for writs of certiorari filed in the Supreme Court by Liddy (Sup. Ct. 74–5678), McCord (Sup. Ct. 74–988), and Barker (Sup. Ct. 74–6308) were denied on January 27, 1975, April 21, 1975, and June 9, 1975, respectively.”

The WSPF report records that Barker’s appeal was denied on February 25, 1975, after which Judge Sirica reduced his sentence to time served.

“Appeal denied February 25, 1975. Sentence reduced by Judge John J. Sirica to time served.”

The WSPF report records that Hunt’s appeal was denied on February 25, 1975, and that he re-entered prison on April 25, 1975.

“Appeal denied February 25, 1975. Re-entered prison on April 25, 1975.”

The WSPF report records that the Court of Appeals upheld the convictions of the original Watergate defendants, and that the defendants other than McCord and Liddy had appealed the denial of their motions to withdraw guilty pleas.

“Convictions of original Watergate defendants upheld by U.S. Court of Appeals. ... McCord and Liddy appealed convictions after trial by jury. Others appealed denial of motions to withdraw pleas of guilty.”

The WSPF report records that Martinez’s and Gonzalez’s appeals were denied on February 25, 1975, after each had been released on parole on March 7, 1974.

“Motion to withdraw guilty plea denied. Released on parole March 7, 1974. Appeal denied February 25, 1975.”

The WSPF report records that Sturgis’s appeal was denied on February 25, 1975.

“Parole Board announced on March 25, 1974, that parole would commence on termination of appeal bond. Appeal denied February 25, 1975.”

In United States v. Mardian the D.C. Circuit held that Mardian’s trial should have been severed and reversed his conspiracy conviction, remanding for a new trial.

“On this ground we reverse and remand for a new trial.”

The D.C. Circuit affirmed the convictions of Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Mitchell for conspiracy and obstruction of justice.

“We therefore affirm the convictions of Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Mitchell for conspiracy as charged in Count 1 and obstruction of justice as charged in Count 2.”

The D.C. Circuit’s opinion records that the jury acquitted Parkinson, found Mardian guilty of conspiracy, and convicted Mitchell, Haldeman and Ehrlichman of conspiracy and obstruction of justice as well as the perjury counts submitted.

“The jury acquitted Parkinson, found Mardian guilty of conspiracy, the only offense with which he was charged, and convicted Mitchell, Haldeman, and Ehrlichman of both conspiracy and obstruction of justice as well as all the individual perjury counts submitted.”

A San Francisco Chronicle obituary reports that three months after the October 1976 reversal, Special Prosecutor Charles Ruff announced that Mardian would not be required to stand trial a second time.

“Three months later, Special Prosecutor Charles Ruff announced that Mr. Mardian would not be required to stand trial a second time.”

The Associated Press reported on April 27, 1978 that John Ehrlichman walked out of Swift Trail Federal Prison Camp that morning, 18 months after he was imprisoned there for his role in the Watergate affair.

“walked out of Swift Trail Federal Prison Camp after sunrise today, 18 months after he was imprisoned there for his role in the Watergate affair”

A UPI photo caption dates Ehrlichman’s release from the Safford federal prison camp to April 27, 1978, after 18 months.

“as he was leaving on April 27, 1978, a free man after serving 18 months at the Safford Federal Prison Camp”

The same obituary states that Haldeman was released from prison in December 1978.

“Since December 1978, when he was released from prison”

A New York Times obituary reports that Haldeman’s sentence of two and a half to eight years was later reduced to the 18 months he served at the minimum security federal prison at Lompoc, California.

“He was sentenced to two and a half to eight years in prison, but the sentence later was reduced to the 18 months that he served at the minimum security federal prison in Lompoc, Calif.”

The Associated Press reported from Lompoc, Calif. in the Dec. 20, 1978 Daily Sentinel that H. R. Haldeman walked out of prison shortly after dawn that day as a parolee.

“Former White House aide H.R. Haldeman walked out of prison shortly after dawn today, a parolee”

UPI reported on Jan. 19, 1979 that John Mitchell was freed on parole that day, becoming the last convicted Watergate defendant to be released from prison.

“John Mitchell the only U.S. attorney general ever sent to prison, was freed on parole today, becoming the last of the convicted Watergate defendants to be released from prison.”

An Associated Press dispatch dated Jan. 14, 1979 reported that Mitchell would be released the following Friday and that no Watergate figure would then remain in prison.

“With his release next Friday, the prisons no longer will house any men of Watergate.”

The dispatch reported that Mitchell’s time was officially 19 months, five of them on medical furlough, and that Haldeman and Ehrlichman each served 18 months.

“Mitchell’s time, officially, is 19 months, although he was out on medical furlough for five. Haldeman and Ehrlichman each served 18 months.”